We would like to correct Eq. (9) in our paper and, subsequently, to modify the figures for the key generation rates. These corrections do not affect the validity of the main conclusions reported in the paper. The correct form of Eq. (9) in our paper should be ini ≡ Min (A) ini , (B) ini ,
where (A)
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where |χ
iW , which is the state that Alice actually prepares for the bit value i in basis W (=X,Y ), and Aq is Alice's qubit system. One can choose any purification for |χ (A) iW , and, in particular, it should be chosen in such a way that it maximizes the inner product in Eqs. as
Due to this change, the figures for the key generation rate have to be revised. As examples of the revised figures, we show the revised version of Figs. 8, 9, 12, and 13, which are the most important figures for our main conclusions to hold. Notice that there are only minor changes to Figs. 8 and 9, and the changes to Figs. 12 and 13 are relatively major. However, the major changes do not affect the validity of the main conclusions in our paper, which is the importance of the state preparation in measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution and the fact that our schemes can generate the key with the practical channel mode that we have assumed. 
Justification of Eq. (9)
For the derivation of Eq. (9), we invoke Koashi's proof [1] . To apply Koashi's proof, it is important to ensure that: (i) one of the two parties holds a virtual "qubit" (rather than a higher-dimensional system), and (ii) the fictitious measurements performed on the virtual qubit have to form "conjugate" observables. Therefore, it is not valid to consider fidelity alone (which allows arbitrary purifications that may not satisfy the conjugate observables requirement). Fortunately, it turns out to be easy to modify our equation to satisfy the above two requirements.
Since the difference between Eqs. (1) and (2) comes from whether we consider Alice's virtual qubit or Bob's virtual qubit, we focus only on Eq. (1), and the same argument holds for Eq. (2). In Koashi's proof, the security is guaranteed via two alternative tasks: (i) agreement on X (key distillation basis) and (ii) Alice's or Bob's preparation of an eigenstate of Y , the conjugate basis of X, with the use of an extra communication channel. The problem with the original (i.e., uncorrected) version of Eq. (9) is the following. If we use the uncorrected version of Eq. (9) in our paper, then the use of the fidelity means that the real part in Eq. (1) iW and her qubit state |i W Aq in general, and thus, in the uncorrected version of Eq. (9) in our paper, the argument based on the fidelity does not guarantee the security of the protocol. In contrast, with the corrected version of Eq. (9) in our paper, since the maximization over θ and ξ (A) W in Eq. (1) preserves the relationship between Alice's sending state and her qubit state as well as the conjugate relationship between X and Y , we can apply Koashi's proof for the security argument of the protocol.
We thank Wang [2] for raising the concern about the validity of Eq. (9) in our paper.
